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[R]egulations may, no doubt, be considered as in some respects a vio-
lation of natural liberty. But those exertions of the natural liberty of a
few individuals, which might endanger the security of a whole society,
are, and ought to be, restrained by the laws of all governments; of the
most free, as well as of the most despotical. The obligation of building
party walls, in order to prevent the communication of ﬁre, [emphasis
added] is a violation of natural liberty exactly of the same kind with
the regulations of the banking trade which are here proposed.
— A discussion of restrictions on bank
note issuance in Adam Smith, An Inquiry
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations
I
n his 1776 Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith likened the regulation of bank
note issues to the construction of walls that prevent the spread of ﬁre.
Smith’s application of the notion of ﬁrewalls to banking seems remark-
ably prescient, for the subject of ﬁrewalls has surfaced repeatedly in recent
discussions of proposals to reform banking. In such discussions ﬁrewalls refer
to statutory and regulatory limitations on ﬁnancial transactions between banks
and their afﬁliates.1 These limitations are analogous to ﬁre-proof barriers in
that they are meant to prevent the spread of ﬁnancial difﬁculties within a
banking company. Speciﬁcally, the restrictions should prevent a banking com-
pany from shifting ﬁnancial losses from its nonbank subsidiary to its insured
bank subsidiary and potentially to the federal deposit insurance fund.
This article beneﬁted greatly from suggestions from R. Alton Gilbert (St. Louis Federal
Reserve Bank), Marvin Goodfriend, Thomas Humphrey, Anatoli Kuprianov, Jeffrey Lacker,
Elaine Mandaleris, James McAfee, Edward S. Prescott, Roy Webb, and John Weinberg. Alex
Mendoza provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are the author’s
and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the
Federal Reserve System.
1 Banking parlance employs the term ﬁrewall to refer to other types of restrictions placed
between a bank and its afﬁliates. As discussed in this article, however, ﬁrewalls refer only to
restrictions on transactions.
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The current interest in ﬁrewalls has its roots in the banking crisis of the
early 1930s. Passed in response to the crisis, the Banking Act of 1933 (also
known as the Glass-Steagall Act) prohibited commercial banks from conducting
investment banking activities and from being afﬁliated with investment banking
ﬁrms.2 At the time, congressmen argued that the prohibitions were necessary
(1) to prevent deposits from funding stock market speculation, (2) to limit
conﬂicts of interest, and (3) to protect bank safety.
Many bankers, regulators, and legislators now argue that these concerns
are unjustiﬁed or that they can be mitigated by regulations allowing more
integration of commercial and investment banking. During 1995 and 1996,
Congress considered various proposals to expand the investment banking ac-
tivities allowed to banking organizations by reforming the Glass-Steagall Act.
Under the proposals, investment banking activities would be conducted in a
subsidiary separate from the insured bank, thus isolating the bank from invest-
ment banking losses. Besides Glass-Steagall reform, each proposal included
ﬁrewalls restricting transactions that might be used to shift the investment
bank’s losses to the afﬁliated bank. No proposal gathered sufﬁcient support for
enactment, but discussions continue on the issues of Glass-Steagall reform and
suitable ﬁrewalls for expanded activities.
For many students of banking, the subject of ﬁrewalls raises certain per-
tinent questions: What are ﬁrewalls? Why do we have them? How are they
enforced? In what situations are they useful? This article answers these ques-
tions. Section 1 examines ﬁrewalls. It discusses their origins and development.
It examines Congress’s and regulators’ stated purposes in establishing such ﬁre-
walls. When ﬁrewalls were initially enacted as a provision of the Glass-Steagall
Act, Congress provided little explanation. Later, congressional and regulatory
pronouncements clariﬁed the goal of the restrictions: to prevent banks from
undertaking transactions with nonbank afﬁliates on terms disadvantageous to
the bank. The concern was that these transactions might be intended to rescue
a troubled afﬁliate or to drain the bank for the beneﬁt of its afﬁliate. The
banking crisis of the early 1930s and later notable bank failures contributed
to the concern. One such failure, discussed below, occurred in 1953 when a
Dallas company, owning a chain of nonbank loan companies, purchased two
small banks and proceeded to unload the loan losses of its nonbanks on these
two banks. Both banks were soon closed by auditors. Ultimately, one of the
banks failed, requiring FDIC payments to protect its depositors. Congress ex-
tended the ﬁrewalls in response to the incident. Section 2 describes ﬁrewall
enforcement by the federal banking supervisors.
2 Some authors use the title Glass-Steagall Act to refer only to those sections of the Banking
Act of 1933 dealing with the separation of commercial and investment banking. Others use the
title to refer to the entire act. I will employ the latter usage.J. R. Walter: Firewalls 17
Incentives that could motivate a banking company to engage in such trans-
actions receive little discussion in the legislative history of the ﬁrewalls, in
regulatory commentaries on the ﬁrewalls, or in articles discussing the ﬁrewalls.3
Without a clear understanding of a banking company’s incentive, one ﬁnds it
difﬁcult to justify ﬁrewalls or to evaluate ﬁrewall recommendations included
in reform proposals. Section 3 discusses several situations in which a banking
company could proﬁt from shifting a loss from its nonbank subsidiary to its
bank subsidiary or from shifting bank income to a nonbank subsidiary. For
example, in certain circumstances the banking company could employ such
shifts to transfer wealth from the deposit insurance fund to itself. It is precisely
in these situations that the ﬁrewalls are most likely to be useful.
1. THE FIREWALLS
Firewalls limit, prohibit, or set standards for transactions between banks and
afﬁliated nonbanking companies. Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve
Act prescribe ﬁrewalls and were enacted as amendments to the act in 1933 and
1987, respectively.4 Also prescribing ﬁrewalls are the orders under which the
limited-function securities subsidiaries of bank holding companies (so-called
“section 20 subsidiaries”) operate. In general terms, the ﬁrewalls apply to any
ﬁnancial transactions between a bank and its nonbank afﬁliates, transactions
that might be used to shift the bank’s resources to the nonbank.5 For example,
ﬁrewalls limit loans made by a bank to its afﬁliates. Such requirements are
intended to limit opportunities for the bank to subsidize its afﬁliate with lower-
priced or more risky loans than made to borrowers not afﬁliated with the bank.
23A and 23B Requirements
Section 23A limits banks’ “covered transactions” with any single afﬁliate to 10
percent of the capital and surplus of the bank and with all afﬁliates to no more
than 20 percent. Covered transactions include loans to afﬁliates, investments
in securities issued by afﬁliates, purchases of assets from afﬁliates, acceptance
of securities issued by afﬁliates as collateral on loans, and guarantees for af-
ﬁliates (for example issuing letters of credit on behalf of afﬁliates). Section
3 Articles by Gilbert (1988) and Keeton (1990) discuss ﬁrewalls peripherally. Both articles
enumerate several incentives that could motivate banking companies to undertake such trans-
actions. Macey and Miller (1992), pp. 376–77, mentions one such incentive but provides little
discussion.
4 Sections 23A and 23B are found in the United States Code at 12 U.S.C. 371c and 12
U.S.C. 371c-1, respectively.
5 Beyond the ﬁnancial transactions regulated by Sections 23A and 23B, dividend payments
and stock repurchases might be used to shift a bank’s resources to the parent company and on to
the bank’s afﬁliates. Dividend payments and stock repurchases are also restricted, as discussed in
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23A prohibits banks from purchasing low-quality assets from afﬁliates. All
covered transactions between a bank and an afﬁliate must be on terms that are
consistent with safe and sound banking. Finally, all loans and guarantees must
be secured by collateral equal to at least 100 percent of the value of the loans or
guarantees. Transactions between banks within a bank holding company (BHC)
are exempt from most ﬁrewall restrictions.6
Under section 23A, an afﬁliate of a bank is any company that controls
the bank (the parent bank holding company) or is controlled by the parent
company or the bank’s controlling shareholders. An afﬁliate also can be any
company in which a majority of directors are also directors of the bank or any
bank subsidiary of the bank. In addition, companies that a bank sponsors and
advises under contract are considered afﬁliates. Prime examples are the real
estate investment trusts (REITs)—closed-end funds investing in real estate—
whose association with banks led to bank ﬁnancial losses in the 1970s (Sinkey
1979, pp. 237–55).
Section 23B expands on 23A by adding that covered transactions must
be on arm’s-length terms (i.e., on terms comparable to those the bank would
normally offer to nonafﬁliated companies). Section 23B also requires that arm’s-
length terms be applied to certain additional transactions that might transfer a
bank’s resources to its afﬁliate. These are the sale of securities or assets to an
afﬁliate (section 23A covers purchases of assets from afﬁliates), any payments
to an afﬁliate, any service transactions, transactions occurring when an afﬁliate
acts as an agent or broker for the bank, or any bank transaction that indirectly
beneﬁts an afﬁliate.
Section 23B contains several outright prohibitions. It prohibits a bank,
when acting as a ﬁduciary, from purchasing securities or other assets from an
afﬁliate. For example, a bank may not purchase assets from afﬁliates for its
trust customers. The prohibition does not apply when the ﬁduciary agreement
speciﬁcally allows purchases of afﬁliate assets.7 A bank also is prohibited
from purchasing securities underwritten by an afﬁliate during the underwriting
period. Last, section 23B prohibits a bank or its afﬁliate from in any way
indicating that the bank is responsible for obligations of the afﬁliate.
6 Prohibitions on the purchase of low-quality assets and the requirement that transactions
be on terms that are consistent with safe and sound banking apply between afﬁliated banks (12
U.S.C. 371c(d)).
7 Unlike most other 23A and 23B limitations intended to prevent transactions detrimental to
the bank, this prohibition aims to prevent transactions detrimental to bank trust customers. The
apparent concern is with the bank putting the afﬁliate’s, and therefore the BHC’s, interest ahead
of the trust customer’s.J. R. Walter: Firewalls 19
Origins and Development of Sections 23A and 23B8
Glass-Steagall Act Firewalls
Section 23A was enacted in 1933 as part of the Glass-Steagall Act. The act
was adopted in response to the stock market crash of October 1929 and the
banking panic of 1932 and 1933. In 1932 and early 1933 nearly 1,850 banks
failed (U.S. Congress, Senate [1933], p. 6). President Roosevelt responded by
declaring a nationwide bank holiday in March 1933. In addition to limiting
transactions between a bank and its afﬁliates, the act separated commercial and
investment banking, established federal deposit insurance, made changes to the
Federal Reserve System, and expanded branching privileges of national banks
(Kelly 1985b, p. 41; Macey and Miller 1992, pp. 21–24).
The legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act indicates that Congress
was concerned with perceived conﬂicts of interest emanating from ties between
commercial and investment banking, the use of bank funds for excess stock
market speculation, and the adverse affects on bank safety of afﬁliation with
securities ﬁrms (Kelly 1985a, p. 231; U.S. Congress, Senate [1933], pp. 1,
6–10). These concerns were met by prohibiting banks from directly perform-
ing investment banking functions and prohibiting banks from afﬁliations with
investment banking companies.9
The legislative history of the act is fairly clear about Congress’s reasons for
the separation of commercial and investment banking, but it is unclear about
Congress’s reasons for the ﬁrewalls. The portion of the congressional committee
report on the Glass-Steagall Act that speciﬁcally mentions transaction restric-
tions is of little help in determining why Congress believed the restrictions were
necessary (see U.S. Congress, Senate [1933], pp. 9–10). The mention of the
transaction restrictions occurs within a discussion of problems that can emanate
from afﬁliations between banks and securities ﬁrms. Since bank-securities ﬁrm
afﬁliations were, for the most part, prohibited by Glass-Steagall, there seems
to have been little reason to enact transaction restrictions. Nevertheless, one
8 See Table 1 for an outline of the history of ﬁrewall legislation and regulation.
9 Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act accomplish the separation of commer-
cial and investment banking. In broad terms, and with some important exceptions, these sections
may be outlined as follows:
Section 16 limits the securities-dealing activities of national banks to purchasing or selling
securities on the order of their customers. In addition, national banks may not underwrite securities.
Section 16 restrictions are applied to state member banks by Glass-Steagall’s section 5.
Section 20 prohibits national and state member banks from being afﬁliated with organizations
that are engaged principally in securities activities.
Section 21 prohibits ﬁrms engaged in securities activities from accepting deposits. In effect
this section extends securities activity restrictions to state nonmember banks. Sections 16, 20, and
32 do not restrict these banks.
Section 32 prohibits any ofﬁcer, director, or employee interlocks between national or state
member banks and any organizations primarily engaged in securities activities. (Fein 1996, sect.
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Table 1 Firewalls’ Legislative and Regulatory Development and
Their Requirements
Banking Act of 1933 (also known as the Glass-Steagall Act)
Amended the Federal Reserve Act to add section 23A, which contained ﬁrewalls limiting transactions
between Federal Reserve member banks and their afﬁliates. Brieﬂy, 23A included the following
restrictions:
— Limited to a total of 10 percent of bank capital any of the following transactions: loans to an
afﬁliate; purchases under repurchase agreement of securities held by an afﬁliate; investments in the
obligations of an afﬁliate; or the acceptance of obligations of an afﬁliate as loan collateral. These
same transactions were limited to 20 percent of the bank’s capital for the sum of all afﬁliates.
— All loans to afﬁliates were to be backed with collateral worth at least 110 percent of the value
of the loan.
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
Contained ﬁrewalls that prohibited the transactions restricted by 23A. Covered both member and
nonmember banks owned by multi-bank holding companies.
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1966
Repealed the BHCAct ﬁrewalls but expanded 23A to cover all insured banks, member and nonmember.
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982
Made a number of amendments to 23A, including
— Restricted to 10 percent of bank capital all purchases of assets from any afﬁliate (20 percent for
the sum of all afﬁliates); previously only purchases under repurchase agreements were restricted;
— Added guarantees, acceptances, and letters of credit on behalf of any afﬁliate to the list of
transactions subject to the 10 and 20 percent limitation;
— Required that transactions be on terms consistent with safe and sound banking;
— Prohibited the purchase of low-quality assets from afﬁliates;
— Exempted afﬁliated banks and banks’ subsidiaries from most transaction restrictions;
— Expanded the list of assets acceptable as collateral for loans to afﬁliates, and modiﬁed the collateral-
to-loan ratios;
— Expanded the deﬁnition of afﬁliate to include REITs and other companies sponsored and advised
by a bank, its subsidiaries, or afﬁliates.
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
Amended the Federal Reserve Act to add section 23B. Section 23B requires that transactions between a
bank and its afﬁliates must be on terms comparable to those the bank would normally offer to nonafﬁliated
companies (i.e., on arm’s-length terms).
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
Extended 23A and 23B to savings institutions.
1987 Board of Governors’ Orders for Section 20 Subsidiaries
Restricted ﬁnancial transactions between banks and their section 20 afﬁliates and between banks and cus-
tomers of section 20 afﬁliates. Applied to section 20 subsidiaries that limit themselves to underwriting and
dealing only in bank eligible securities plus commercial paper, municipal revenue securities, mortgage-
backed securities, and consumer receivable-backed securities. A bank with a section 20 afﬁliate may not
— make loans to issuers for the purpose of payment of principal, interest, or dividends on bank-
ineligible securities underwritten by its section 20 afﬁliate;
— make loans secured by or for the purpose of purchasing bank-ineligible securities underwritten by
its section 20 afﬁliate during the underwriting period, and for 30 days thereafter;
— make loans or provide guarantees (for example a letter of credit) that will enhance the credit-
worthiness or marketability of a bank-ineligible security underwritten by its section 20 afﬁliate;
— purchase bank-ineligible securities underwritten by its section 20 afﬁliate during the underwriting
period and for 60 days after;
— purchase from its section 20 afﬁliate bank-ineligible securities in which the section 20 makes a
market.
1989 Board of Governors’ Orders for Section 20 Subsidiaries
Restricted ﬁnancial transactions between banks and their section 20 afﬁliates and between banks and cus-
tomers of section 20 afﬁliates. Applied to section 20 subsidiaries that underwrite and deal in debt and
equity securities. The prohibitions under 1987 orders also applied to these subsidiaries. In addition, under
the 1989 orders a bank may not
— make loans to its section 20 afﬁliate;
— make any ﬁnancial asset purchases from, or sell ﬁnancial assets to, afﬁliated section 20s;
— provide a guarantee, such as a letter of credit, for its section 20 afﬁliate.J. R. Walter: Firewalls 21
can imagine at least three important factors that might have led Congress to
enact the transaction restrictions.
First was the failure of the Bank of the United States in December 1930.
This failure was caused by the bank president’s appropriation of large portions
of bank funds, through the bank’s afﬁliates, to his own personal and highly
speculative business ventures. His actions created widespread suspicion of all
commercial bank afﬁliates (Perkins 1971, pp. 496–97).
Second, 1931 subcommittee hearings leading to the Glass-Steagall Act in-
cluded a discussion of a number of securities afﬁliate “abuses” Congress may
have believed applicable to other types of afﬁliates (U.S. Congress, Senate
[1931], pp. 1052–68). Speciﬁcally, the hearing report notes that a bank might
extend credit to a troubled afﬁliate to rescue it, purchase assets of a troubled af-
ﬁliate, or make unsafe loans to the afﬁliate’s customers. According to the report,
“[w]hen dealing with its afﬁliate, the bank is really dealing with itself.” As a
result, “there tends to be a breaking down of those limitations on the extension
of credit which the bank sets up in other cases to guard against the making of
excessive or poorly secured loans” (U.S. Congress, Senate [1931], p. 1066).
Third, in spite of the general prohibition of bank-securities ﬁrm afﬁliation,
the Glass-Steagall Act left banks with the ability to afﬁliate with ﬁrms with
limited securities powers. Perhaps Congress foresaw similar abuses with these
afﬁliates and wanted to restrict transactions between banks and these limited
securities afﬁliates.
For whatever reason or reasons the act introduced ﬁrewalls for most types
of bank afﬁliates. According to a Senate Report on the bill that became the
Glass-Steagall Act, an important goal of the bill was “[t]o separate as far as
possible national and member banks from afﬁliates of all kinds” [emphasis
added] (U.S. Congress, Senate [1933], p. 10). Section 23A ﬁrewalls helped
accomplish the goal.
As passed in 1933, section 23A applied only to Federal Reserve member
banks. Included in this category are all national banks, meaning banks char-
tered by the federal government and thus required by statute to be Federal
Reserve members, and state-chartered banks that elect to become members of
the Federal Reserve.
Firewalls Extended by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCAct) extended ﬁrewalls similar
to those in 23A to all banks, member and nonmember, owned by multi-bank
BHCs.10 The ﬁrewalls extension was at least in part provoked by the failure
of a Chicago bank, which stemmed from transactions with its parent BHC
(discussed below). The BHCAct included a provision completely prohibiting
10 The BHCAct of 1956 covered only BHCs owning two or more banks. In 1970 the act
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speciﬁed transactions: bank loans to, investments in, and purchases of assets
from afﬁliates or the parent BHC (Senate Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong., Sess. 2,
reprinted in U.S. Code: Congressional and Administrative News 2482, 2496–97
[1956]). Section 23A ﬁrewalls differed in that they allowed such transactions
as long as their dollar aggregate amounted to no more than 10 or 20 percent
of bank capital.
For the most part, the BHCAct (of which the ﬁrewall provisions were only
a small portion) was the result of congressional concern over the lack of regu-
latory control of bank holding companies (Senate Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong.,
Sess. 2, reprinted in U.S. Code: Congressional and Administrative News 2482,
2483 [1956]). While banks were extensively regulated and supervised either
under federal or state law, bank holding companies were relatively free of such
regulation prior to the passage of the act. The act brought the activities of
multi-bank BHCs under Federal Reserve regulatory and supervisory authority.
Just as with the reports on section 23A, the House and Senate committee
reports on the BHCAct lack explanation. In this case, they fail to explain
Congress’s motive for completely prohibiting speciﬁed transactions rather than
simply limiting them, as did section 23A. Yet, in contrast to the legislative
history surrounding the passage of 23A ﬁrewalls, the reports do fairly clearly
explain Congress’s motivation for the ﬁrewalls in general: to prevent a parent
BHC from taking “undue advantage of the resources of its subsidiary banks”
(Senate Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong., Sess. 2, reprinted in U.S. Code: Congres-
sional and Administrative News 2482, 2496 [1955]). While the history indicates
that “no widespread abuse of this nature has been brought to the attention of
[Congress],” one such case was discussed in hearings leading to the passage
of the act. In this case, a Dallas company that owned a chain of (nonbank)
small-loan companies purchased slightly more than 50 percent of the shares of
two small Chicago banks. Following the bank purchases, the Dallas company
sold to the banks questionable assets held by the BHC at face value less a
small discount (2 percent). The asset sales shifted BHC losses to the banks,
and within a few weeks of the shift the banks were closed by state auditors.
Ultimately, some of the shifted losses were borne by the FDIC, as the FDIC was
able to reopen one of the banks only after providing ﬁnancial assistance (U.S.
Congress, House [1955], pp. 18–19; FDIC 1953, p. 8). According to a House
report discussing the BHCAct, failure to institute the BHCAct restrictions on
interafﬁliate transactions “would be to invite a repetition of the [Dallas BHC
incident]” (U.S. Congress, House [1955], p. 19).
Firewalls Further Extended by 1966 BHCAct Amendments
In 1966 the Bank Holding Company Act was amended to repeal the act’s
prohibitions of interafﬁliate transactions, once again leaving only the ﬁrewalls
laid out in section 23A to restrict such transactions. At the same time, 23A
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BHC and subsidiaries of its parent. In addition, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act was amended to apply section 23A to all federally insured commercial
banks, subjecting almost all banks to the requirements of section 23A (Rose
and Talley 1982, p. 693; Senate Rep. No. 1179, 89th Cong., Sess. 2, reprinted
in U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 2385, 2396 [1966]).
Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 Amendments to 23A
In 1982 section 23A was amended in several important ways. According to a
Senate Banking Committee report, the amendments had three objectives. First,
the changes were meant to liberalize unnecessarily restrictive provisions in the
statute. Second, they were to close several loopholes. Third, they were intended
to reorganize and clarify the statute to improve compliance and enforcement
(Senate Rep. No. 97–536, 97th Cong., Sess. 2, reprinted in U.S. Code Con-
gressional and Administrative News, 3054, 3085 [1982]).
Several signiﬁcant circumstances preceded, and ultimately led to, the 1982
revisions to section 23A. For a number of years bankers had argued that section
23A unnecessarily stiﬂed low-risk, interafﬁliate transactions. In addition, in the
mid-1970s several large banks were adversely affected by transactions with
afﬁliates or with ﬁrms the banks sponsored and advised.
The failure of Hamilton National Bank in 1976 served to illustrate how
section 23A might fail to prevent interafﬁliate transactions detrimental to the
bank.11 The failure of the Chattanooga-based, $461-million-asset Hamilton Na-
tional Bank was the third largest bank failure in U.S. history up to that time.
Hamilton National Bank was owned by a BHC, Hamilton Bancshares, Inc.,
which also owned nonbank subsidiaries including Hamilton Mortgage Corpo-
ration, an Atlanta-based mortgage banking company specializing in real estate
development loans. In 1974, the real estate industry experienced major prob-
lems. Consequently, growing numbers of Hamilton Mortgage Corporation’s
borrowers began to default. When examined in September 1974, Hamilton
National Bank was holding more than $100 million in mortgages originated
by the mortgage subsidiary, many of which were troubled (Comptroller of the
Currency 1977, p. 233). Ultimately the bank failed largely from losses on loans
purchased from its mortgage afﬁliate (Comptroller of the Currency 1977, pp.
233–34; Sinkey 1979, pp. 199–205).12
11 Hamilton National Bank was the only one of 120 bank failures occurring in the ten years
prior to the 1982 amendment to section 23A that could be directly attributed to interafﬁliate asset
transactions (Morgan Guaranty [1983] as cited in Saunders [1988], p. 168, footnote 43).
12 Hamilton National Bank’s purchases from its afﬁliate far exceeded 10 percent of its cap-
ital. While at the time 23A did not speciﬁcally restrict a bank’s purchase of loans from its
afﬁliate, the statute deﬁned “extensions of credit” to an afﬁliate, which were restricted, to include
a bank’s “discount of promissory notes” held by its afﬁliate. Under a 1974 Board of Governors
interpretation of 23A, the phrase “discount of promissory notes” includes the purchase of loans.
This interpretation indicates that, with the exception of the amount permitted under the 10 percent
limitation, Hamilton’s purchases were in violation of 23A (Board of Governors 1974, pp. 726–27).24 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Also during the mid-1970s, several large U.S. banks sustained signiﬁcant
losses as a result of bailing out associated REITs. A number of large banks
sponsored and advised these closed-end real estate investment funds in the
1970s. As the real estate market slumped in 1974 and REITs experienced
ﬁnancial problems, REITs’ ability to issue commercial paper diminished. Be-
cause commercial paper issues provided a major portion of REIT funding, the
REITs faced insolvency. To prevent REIT failures, a number of banks gathered
together to fund a costly rescue operation (Sinkey 1979, pp. 237–55; Cornyn
et al. 1986, pp. 187–88).
In response to concern with perceived deﬁciencies in section 23A, Congress
called on the Federal Reserve to recommend amendments (Rose and Talley
1983, p. 424). The Fed’s proposals served as the basis for the Banking Afﬁliates
Act of 1982, which made a number of substantive changes to section 23A (Rose
and Talley 1983, p. 424; Senate Rep. No. 97–536, 97th Cong., Sess. 2, reprinted
in U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 3054, 3085 [1982]). The
Banking Afﬁliates Act was enacted as a section of the Garn-St. Germain De-
pository Institutions Act of 1982. Guiding the proposals was the view that the
statute was meant to prevent the misuse of a bank’s resources stemming from
large-scale transactions with afﬁliates (Board of Governors 1981, pp. 1, 6, 28,
31, 39, 42–43). Speciﬁcally, the Fed’s concern with interafﬁliate transactions
was that “because of this relationship [afﬁliation], the bank may engage in
transactions that may adversely affect its condition. Such transactions may be
designed either to rescue a ﬁnancially troubled afﬁliate or to ‘drain’ a bank for
the beneﬁt of an afﬁliate” (Board of Governors 1981, p. 6).
The Federal Reserve proposed that REITs and other companies sponsored
and advised by a bank or a bank’s subsidiary or afﬁliate be considered afﬁl-
iates. This proposal was motivated by REIT losses and the Fed’s view that
the relationship between a bank and a REIT it sponsors is in some respects
an afﬁliate relationship (Board of Governors 1981, pp. 23–25). Other impor-
tant changes to section 23A were a broadened deﬁnition of asset purchases
considered “covered” transactions; the addition of guarantees, acceptances, and
letters of credit issued on behalf of an afﬁliate as “covered” transactions; the
addition of a provision requiring that all “covered” transactions with afﬁliates
be on terms that are consistent with safe and sound banking practices; the pro-
hibition of purchases of low-quality assets; the exemption of afﬁliated banks
from most restrictions on transactions; the exclusion of banks’ majority-owned
subsidiaries from the deﬁnition of an afﬁliate; and an expanded list of assets
that are acceptable as collateral backing transactions with afﬁliates (Senate Rep.
No. 97–536, 97th Cong., Sess. 2, reprinted in U.S. Code Congressional and
Administrative News, 3054, 3085–86 [1982]).J. R. Walter: Firewalls 25
CEBA and FIRREA Augment 23A Firewalls
The Federal Reserve Act ﬁrewalls were expanded in 1987 with the addition of
section 23B, passed as a provision of the Competitive Equality Banking Act
of 1987 (CEBA). Previously in 1983 and 1984, Senate bills had proposed the
expansion of bank securities, insurance, and real estate development powers
and included proposals to amend the Federal Reserve Act by adding section
23B. Although these bills were not adopted, 23B resurfaced a few years later
in CEBA (Miles 1988, p. 478, footnote 4). The Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) extended sections 23A and
23B to savings institutions following the thrift industry crisis of the 1980s (U.S.
Congress, House [1989], pp. 169–70; 12 U.S.C. sec. 1468(a)).
Firewalls Surrounding Underwriting Subsidiaries
A number of large BHCs currently take advantage of a loophole in the
Glass-Steagall Act and operate securities-underwriting subsidiaries (named
“section 20 subsidiaries” for the section of the act containing the loophole).13 As
discussed below, the loophole is limited, so securities subsidiaries of
BHCs are somewhat circumscribed compared to securities ﬁrms not owned by
BHCs. BHCs’ underwriting subsidiaries face thicker interafﬁliate transaction
ﬁrewalls, instituted by Board of Governors orders, than those found in sections
23A and 23B. The thicker ﬁrewalls have the same purpose as the 23A and 23B
ﬁrewalls.
Before the Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1933, member banks could be
afﬁliated with securities-underwriting companies. Following its passage, and
continuing until the 1980s, member banks were denied such afﬁliations. Nev-
ertheless, under the Glass-Steagall Act banks and their afﬁliates were allowed
to underwrite certain assets such as U.S. government securities and general
obligation municipal securities (Fein 1996, pp. 8-7, 8-12). Such securities are
known as “bank-eligible” securities. With the advent of signiﬁcant banking
deregulation and heightened competition in the 1970s and 1980s, banking
companies began to argue for the authority to conduct additional securities
activities. In late 1984, Citicorp submitted an application to the Federal Re-
serve Board for approval to begin underwriting certain ineligible securities in
its eligible securities subsidiary. While this initial application was withdrawn,
Citicorp resubmitted a modiﬁed application in 1985 and was later joined by
two other large New York BHCs making similar applications.
In response to these applications, the Federal Reserve Board reviewed
the Glass-Steagall Act and concluded that the law does not prohibit a com-
pany afﬁliated with a member bank from underwriting and dealing in certain
13 As of 1996 there were 38 section 20 subsidiaries of BHCs (American Banker, May 10,
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securities if these activities provide no more than 5 percent of the gross
revenues of the subsidiary (Board of Governors 1987, p. 476; Fein 1996,
p. 8-16). Glass-Steagall does contain sections which prevent banks from con-
ducting investment banking activities directly and prevent member banks from
afﬁliating with companies that do so. Section 20 prohibits Federal Reserve
member banks from afﬁliation with any ﬁrm “engaged principally” in the is-
sue, ﬂotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution of securities. The Board
ruled that if revenues from these prohibited activities account for no more than
5 percent of the subsidiary’s total revenue, the subsidiary is not “engaged prin-
cipally” in the activity. In this case the subsidiary may be afﬁliated with a mem-
ber bank without violating the Glass-Steagall Act (Board of Governors 1987,
pp. 475–76).14 The only other securities beyond eligible securities that these
subsidiaries were authorized to underwrite and deal in were commercial pa-
per, municipal revenues securities, mortgage-backed securities, and consumer
receivable-backed securities (Fein 1996, p. 8-49).
1987-Order Firewalls
In 1987, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve established additional
ﬁrewalls that not only prohibited certain transactions between a bank and its
afﬁliated section 20 subsidiary, but also prohibited them between a bank and the
customers of its section 20 afﬁliate. The Board’s 1987 ﬁrewalls are provisions
of Board orders authorizing securities underwriting and dealing. A bank with
a section 20 afﬁliate may not
— make loans to securities issuers for the purpose of payment of princi-
pal, interest, or dividends on bank-ineligible securities underwritten by its
section 20 afﬁliate;
— make loans secured by or for the purpose of purchasing bank-ineligible
securities underwritten by its section 20 afﬁliate during the underwriting
period, and for 30 days thereafter;
— make loans or provide guarantees (for example a letter of credit) that will
enhance the creditworthiness or marketability of bank-ineligible securities
underwritten by its section 20 afﬁliate;
14 Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act applies only to banks that are members of the Fed-
eral Reserve System. As previously noted, this contingent includes all national banks, i.e., those
chartered by the federal government, and state-chartered banks that choose to be members (state
members). Since section 20 does not apply to state-chartered nonmember banks, these banks may
be afﬁliated with securities-underwriting companies engaged principally in underwriting ineligible
securities. A nonmember bank may not engage in underwriting in the bank itself because Glass-
Steagall’s section 21 prohibits such activities for member and nonmember banks. According to
a 1981 Supreme Court ruling, section 21 does not extend to bank subsidiaries or afﬁliates (Fein
1996, p. 2-6). Nonmember banks are subject to the supervision of the FDIC, which has established
several ﬁrewalls similar to those established by the Federal Reserve for section 20 afﬁliates (Fein
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— purchase bank-ineligible securities underwritten by its section 20 afﬁl-
iate during the underwriting period and for 60 days after;
— purchase from its section 20 afﬁliate bank-ineligible securities in which
the section 20 makes a market.15
In its discussion of the ﬁrewalls, the Federal Reserve indicated that the
prohibitions on loans are meant to prevent “imprudent” and “unwise” lending
to help out afﬁliated section 20s (Board of Governors 1987, pp. 496–97). Like-
wise, the securities purchase prohibitions are meant to preclude “unwarranted”
and “detrimental” purchases by banks intended to prevent section 20 losses
(Board of Governors 1987, pp. 497–98).
1989-Order Firewalls
In 1989 the Fed increased the revenue limit from 5 to 10 percent and expanded
the types of securities the subsidiaries could underwrite and deal in to include
most debt and equity securities (Fein 1996, pp. 1-16–1-18, 8-24.2, 8-29).16
For those section 20 afﬁliates that chose to expand underwriting and dealing
activities beyond the four types of securities authorized in 1987, ﬁrewalls were
augmented. The major change was that of prohibiting loans by banks to their
section 20 afﬁliates. Also, under the 1989 orders, banks were prohibited from
making any ﬁnancial asset purchases from, or selling such assets to, afﬁliated
section 20s.17 Last, banks were prohibited from providing a guarantee, such as
a letter of credit, for their section 20 afﬁliate. The stricter ﬁrewalls for section
20s were developed out of concern for the increased potential for losses from
the expanded operations allowed to subsidiaries operating under the 1989 orders
(Board of Governors 1989, pp. 203–06). Because of these ﬁrewalls and other
more demanding restrictions, some section 20 afﬁliates have chosen to conﬁne
15 These prohibitions contain certain exceptions. For a complete list of all underwriting sub-
sidiary ﬁrewalls, see Board of Governors, Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual (1995),
sect. 2185.0, pp. 15–28, or U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce (1995), pp. 70–73. Additional require-
ments and restrictions are placed on relations between banks and underwriting afﬁliates beyond
these transactions ﬁrewalls. The additional requirements are meant to limit the opportunity for the
exploitation of conﬂicts of interest and to provide a clear separation between the underwriting and
bank subsidiaries of the BHC. For example, BHCs are required to maintain separate ofﬁces for
the section 20 subsidiary and limit employee, ofﬁcer, and director interlocks and communication
of conﬁdential customer information between section 20 subsidiaries and afﬁliated banks. A
section 20 subsidiary is also required to disclose that it is separate from any afﬁliated bank and
that securities offered, sold, or recommended are not FDIC insured (Board of Governors, Bank
Holding Company Supervision Manual 1995, sect. 2185.0, pp. 15–28).
16 In July 1996 the Board of Governors proposed an increase in the revenue limit to 25
percent (Board of Governors 1996b).
17 The 1989 orders granted an exception allowing banks to purchase U.S. Treasury securities
from, and sell such assets to, section 20 afﬁliates. In October 1996 the exception was expanded
to include all securities with readily identiﬁable and publicly available market quotations (Board
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their activities to those allowed by the 1987 orders so that they are limited only
by the 1987 ﬁrewalls.
2. ENFORCEMENT
Sections 23A and 23B and the section 20 ﬁrewalls are enforced by bank and
bank holding company examiners in periodic on-site examinations. In broad
terms, examination for ﬁrewall compliance follows a simple two-step pattern.
Examiners ﬁrst determine if the bank or afﬁliate has procedures in place that
should prevent violations. Second, they run tests to determine if those proce-
dures are being followed.
Banks are examined for compliance with 23A and 23B ﬁrewalls during
each periodic safety and soundness examination. Bank examiners ﬁrst obtain
documents describing the bank’s policies and procedures to verify that the bank
has rules in place to avoid exceeding section 23A limits and to ensure that it is
meeting the requirements of sections 23A and 23B. To test whether the bank’s
rules are observed, the examiner obtains from the bank a list of all transactions
between the bank and afﬁliates. This list is veriﬁed against other sources to
ensure that the bank did not exclude transactions. For example, to test whether
he has a complete list of interafﬁliate loans, the examiner will compare the
list supplied by the bank with other accounting records maintained by the
bank, such as customer liability records. Using the veriﬁed list, the examiner
reviews the transactions to ensure (1) that together they do not exceed limits
established by section 23A, (2) that 23A collateral requirements are met, (3)
that low-quality loans have not been purchased from afﬁliates, and (4) that all
transactions with afﬁliates are consistent with safe and sound banking practices
(Board of Governors, Commercial Bank Examination Manual 1995).
Likewise, all bank holding companies are examined, or inspected, peri-
odically. Only examiners from the Federal Reserve conduct these inspections.
The holding company’s policies and procedures regarding transactions between
subsidiary banks and afﬁliates are reviewed to verify that procedures are in
place to prevent violations of 23A and 23B (Board of Governors, Bank Hold-
ing Company Supervision Manual 1995, sect. 2020.1, p. 6, Item 3(g)). BHC
inspections include a “thorough analysis of most intercompany transactions”
to test whether the BHC’s stated policies are being followed (Board of Gov-
ernors, Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual 1995, sect. 2020.0, p. 2).
The analysis includes a review of a list of all transactions between subsidiary
banks and afﬁliates and of the terms, conditions, and circumstances of each
listed transaction to ensure that none violates 23A or 23B.
At least once a year, section 20 subsidiaries are examined by Federal Re-
serve examiners. As with bank and BHC examinations, the section 20 examiner
reviews procedure manuals to ensure they provide guidelines that will prevent
ﬁrewall breaches. For example, the examiner may obtain copies of afﬁliatedJ. R. Walter: Firewalls 29
banks’ loan policy manuals to verify that they clearly state the types of loans
restricted, such as loans to the section 20’s current underwriting customers.
The examiner will also assure that there is a procedure in place for notify-
ing loan ofﬁcers in the afﬁliated bank of the current underwriting customers
of the section 20 subsidiary. The examiner may then perform tests to verify
consistency with the procedures. For example, to determine that the bank has
not ﬁnanced the purchase of securities underwritten by the afﬁliated section 20
unit, the examiner will obtain a list of securities underwritten by the section 20
entity and compare the list to the bank’s collateral ledger. The ledger lists the
collateral against which loans are made, allowing the examiner to conﬁrm that
there is no overlap (Board of Governors, Bank Holding Company Supervision
Manual 1995, section 2185.0, p. 13).
The responses of supervisory agencies to violations vary depending upon
the severity of the violation. Examiners may simply notify the bank or the
BHC of the violation and require the modiﬁcation of procedures to prevent
its recurrence. The supervisory agencies can impose penalties including cease
and desist orders; actions to remove directors, ofﬁcers, and employees; and
monetary penalties on institutions or individuals (Spong 1995, pp. 113–17;
Board of Governors, Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual 1995, sect.
2110.0). For example, in 1983 the FDIC assessed a $1,000 penalty against
a bank director, in part because of violations of 23A. The bank’s board of
directors, with this director’s concurring vote, had authorized the bank to make
loans to an afﬁliate above 23A loan limits, backed with collateral insufﬁcient
to meet 23A requirements (Fitzpatrick v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 765
F.2d 569 [6th Cir. 1985]).
3. WHEN FIREWALLS ARE USEFUL
The preceding historical review reveals that ﬁrewalls were prescribed to prevent
adverse resource shifts. What has never been adequately explained, however, is
why a BHC would want to effect such shifts in the ﬁrst place. For a BHC could
only beneﬁt from the shifts if they reduced losses or enhanced proﬁts.18 In most
18 Some commentators argue that banks may have a lower cost of funds than nonbanks
due to federal deposit insurance. Allowing banks to lend to their nonbank afﬁliates, thus passing
on the deposit insurance subsidy to the nonbank, could give companies that own both a bank
and a nonbank an unfair competitive advantage over companies not owning banks (for example
see Macey and Miller [1992], p. 377, or the discussion of protestants’ argument against greater
securities powers for BHCs in Board of Governors [1987]). Firewalls might be useful for limiting
or preventing the grant of this unfair advantage and associated allocative efﬁciency losses. But
there is reason to question the quantitative signiﬁcance of the deposit insurance subsidy, and
therefore banks’ ability to subsidize their nonbank afﬁliates. If the subsidy were signiﬁcant, one
would expect banks to displace nonbank sources of credit over time. Instead, over the last several
decades banks have lost share in the funds market, or at best held stable (Boyd and Gertler [1994],
p. 2). Further, a BHC can beneﬁt from shifting the subsidy from its bank to its nonbank afﬁliate
only if proﬁt opportunities in the nonbank afﬁliate, without the beneﬁt of subsidized funds, exceed
proﬁts in the bank.30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
cases, simply shifting losses from one subsidiary to another generates no such
beneﬁt, and the ﬁrewalls would be unnecessary. Still, there are two cases where
the BHC might proﬁt from shifts such that ﬁrewalls would be necessary. In
case number one, some commentators have argued that BHCs can be expected
to use bank resources to prevent the failure of a troubled nonbank subsidiary,
thus preserving the reputation of the BHC.19 That is to say, shifts can reduce
BHC losses when the BHC’s reputation would be damaged by the failure of a
nonbank subsidiary. In case number two, a BHC can reduce losses by shifting
them from a highly capitalized to a less capitalized subsidiary. The reason?
Such shifts allow the BHC to escape some of the loss by taking advantage
of shareholders’ limited liability. In this case, if the less capitalized subsidiary
is an insured bank, then the reduction of loss amounts to a transfer of wealth
from the deposit insurance fund to the BHC. Firewalls, and their associated
penalties, may be useful in reducing the likelihood of shifts motivated by these
incentives since, in either case, nonbank losses can be shifted to the deposit
insurance fund.
To illustrate why, in most cases, there is no beneﬁt when losses are shifted,
consider the example of a bank and a commercial ﬁnance company owned by
a BHC. Should the ﬁnance subsidiary expect to incur loan losses amounting
to $10 million, the BHC would be made no better off by shifting the potential
loss to the bank.20 The BHC, whose assets include the net worth of both the
bank and nonbank, can expect to suffer an equivalent $10 million decline in
the value of its total assets whether the bank or the nonbank subsidiary bears
the loss. Firewalls aside, the bank or the BHC, because of minimum capital
requirements, is likely to face strictures imposed by examiners in response to
any shifts of losses or income that lower the bank’s capital. Accordingly, the
BHC not only gains nothing, it may suffer some cost from any shift of losses.
In this case, a shift of losses is not proﬁtable or attractive, with or without
ﬁrewalls.
On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the story could be different when
a BHC’s reputation is at stake. Some authors argue that a BHC has an in-
centive to use all its resources, including resources of its bank subsidiaries, to
support troubled nonbank subsidiaries (see, for example, Cornyn et al. [1986],
or Keeley and Bennett [1988]). The major factor cited is the desire to preserve
the reputation of the BHC. Cornyn et al. argue that “experience suggests that
BHC management will draw on the ﬁnancial resources of the bank to assist
19 This section assumes that BHC managers will seek the best interest of shareholders; in
other words, that they are proﬁt maximizers. Gilbert (1988, pp. 70–71) argues that the desire
of BHC managers to save their jobs, when confronted with a troubled afﬁliate and managers’
fraudulent schemes to steal from banks, can motivate such shifts.
20 This assumes that the bank’s capital is at least $10 million. As will be discussed later, the
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a troubled subsidiary” (p. 191).21 The primary reason is the “avoidance of
serious reputation damage to the holding company and its bank” (p. 187) from
the failure of a subsidiary. They cite several cases, one of which saw banks
taking on some of the losses of REITs, discussed earlier in this article.22
If a BHC owns a nonbank with expected losses exceeding the nonbank’s
capital, then the BHC may be best served by simply allowing the subsidiary
to fail. Because of the protection afforded the BHC by shareholders’ limited
liability, the BHC stands to lose no more than the value of its equity investment
in the subsidiary. The subsidiary’s creditors suffer the remainder of the loss.
But the failure of one subsidiary may affect the public’s perception of the com-
petence of the BHC management and of the soundness of other segments of the
company. In turn, the shift in public perception could lead to creditor demands
for higher interest rates from the BHC and its surviving nonbank subsidiaries.
In addition, any harm to the reputation of surviving subsidiaries may mean
lost business opportunities. Bailing out the troubled nonbank subsidiary with
bank resources, rather than allowing it to fail and seeking refuge in limited
liability, might leave the BHC’s shareholders better off, even though it leaves
the bank worse off. If the bank is made signiﬁcantly worse off, the probability
of a deposit insurance claim is increased.
Consider the example of a BHC owning three nonbank subsidiaries, each
having net worth (owners’ equity) of $10 million (see Table 2, line 1).
Additionally, it owns a bank with net worth of $100 million. If one of the
subsidiaries faces a loss of $16 million, the “failure” cost to the BHC is
$10 million—the amount of its lost owners’ equity in the troubled subsidiary
should it be allowed to fail. In addition to the failure cost, the BHC will face
“reputation costs” (T-accounts in Table 2 list reputation as an intangible asset
of each subsidiary and reputation cost as a decrement to the asset) for the
sake of this example, summing to $8 million (Table 2, line 2). Such costs
include increased demands from the surviving subsidiaries’ creditors and lost
business opportunities.23 Consequently, the total cost to the BHC of allowing
the failure of the nonbank subsidiary amounts to $18 million—failure costs of
$10 million plus reputation costs of $8 million. If instead $7 million of the
nonbank’s loss were shifted to the bank with the bank purchasing some of the
nonbank’s troubled assets at greater than their market value, for example—
total BHC losses would sum to $16 million (nonbank’s losses of $9 million
plus bank losses of $7 million). The BHC’s shareholders would be better off
21 Gilbert (1988), pp. 70–71, also discusses preservation of reputation as a motive for trans-
ferring bank resources to the nonbank.
22 Cornyn et al. (1986) conclude that ﬁrewalls alone are not sufﬁcient to prevent BHCs from
drawing on bank resources to assist troubled afﬁliates.
23 In my simpliﬁed example I assume the parent BHC issues only equity, so only the sub-





Assets 130 NW∗∗ 130
Nonbank A Nonbank B Nonbank C Bank
TA∗∗ 96 Liab∗∗ 90 TA 96 Liab 90 TA 96 Liab 90 TA 980 Liab 900
Rep∗∗ 4 NW 10 Rep 4 NW 10 Rep 4 NW 10 Rep 20 NW 100
(2)
Nonbank A bears complete loss Parent BHC
Assets NW Parent’s assets and net worth decline by
130-(10+8) 130-(10+8) $18M due to declines in net worth of
$10M at Nonbank A, $2M each at
Nonbanks B and C, and $4M at Bank
Nonbank A Nonbank B Nonbank C Bank
TA 96-16 Liab 90-10 TA 96 Liab 90 TA 96 Liab 90 TA 980 Liab 900
Rep 4-4 NW 10-10 Rep 4-2 NW 10-2 Rep 4-2 NW 10-2 Rep 20-4 NW 100-4
Nonbank A suffers $16M Reputation of Nonbank B Reputation of Nonbank C Reputation is damaged $4M
loss—declares bankruptcy. damaged $2M causing net damaged $2M causing net causing net worth to decline
Loss exceeds net worth, worth to decline by $2M worth to decline by $2M by $4M
leaving creditors with a
$10M loss. Reputational
assets are lost when the
subsidiary fails.
(3)
Nonbank A bears only part of loss: Parent BHC
Assets NW Parent’s assets and net worth decline by
130-(9+7) 130-(9+7) $16M due to $9M decline in net worth of
Nonbank A and $7M decline in net worth
of Bank
Nonbank A Nonbank B Nonbank C Bank
TA 96-9 Liab 90 TA 96 Liab 90 TA 96 Liab 90 TA 980-7 Liab 900
Rep 4 NW 10-9 Rep 4 NW 10 Rep 4 NW 10 Rep 20 NW 100-7
Nonbank A suffers a Value of Bank’s assets falls
$16M loss, but the value by $7M due to shift of loss
of its assets falls by only from Nonbank A. Net worth
$9M because $7M of its likewise declines $7M
loss is shifted to Bank.
Net worth falls by $9M
∗ Here I focus on the parent corporation. One could focus instead on the consolidated enterprise—all
assets, liabilities, and net worth on one balance sheet. The results are equivalent.
∗∗ NW is net worth, TA is tangible assets, Rep is reputation—an intangible asset to the subsidiary,
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by $2 million, creating an incentive for the BHC to shift the losses (Table 2,
line 3).
The reputation-defense argument for shifting losses relies upon the assump-
tion that outsiders have difﬁculty ascertaining the true value of a BHC’s bank
and nonbank subsidiaries’ assets. Given this assumption, any new information
on the quality of subsidiaries’ management would cause outsiders to revise their
estimates of these subsidiaries’ asset values. For example, the failure of one
BHC subsidiary, itself new information about assets of the failed subsidiary, is
likely to be taken as new negative information about the quality of the manage-
ment of surviving subsidiaries of the same company. As a result, outsiders will
lower their estimates of survivors’ asset values. Reputation damage costs will
result when outsiders lower their view of the strength of surviving subsidiaries.
As noted earlier, these costs include creditors’ demands for higher interest rates
from survivors and survivors’ loss of future business opportunities.
Accordingly, if a subsidiary’s failure can be prevented both at a cost less
than the BHC’s estimate of reputation costs and in a manner that avoids the
revelation of losses to outsiders, BHC shareholders will beneﬁt. Precisely be-
cause bank assets are difﬁcult for outsiders to value, losses shifted to the bank
may go unnoticed.
While the parent company could assist the nonbank itself, it may be better
able to hide the loss by shifting it to its bank subsidiary. If the parent holds
few liquid assets, assisting the troubled afﬁliate could require the parent to
issue debt, commercial paper, or sell one of its other subsidiaries. Such actions
necessitate public disclosures and notices, highlighting the BHC’s predicament.
If instead the bank purchased the nonbank’s troubled assets at inﬂated prices,
this interafﬁliate transaction would quite likely escape outside notice.
Nevertheless, the BHC has a counterincentive weighing against the previ-
ously discussed incentive to shift losses to its bank. Any shift of losses will
increase the probability of the bank’s failure. Surely, the bank’s failure would
have reputation consequences for the BHC, so that any increase in the proba-
bility of the bank’s failure due to a shift will tend to offset the BHC’s desire to
shift losses. While this counterincentive may be too weak to prevent all shifts
of losses, it will tend to prevent those most dangerous to bank safety.
While preservation of reputation provides one set of incentives under which
a BHC might beneﬁt from shifting nonbank losses to a bank, a second set of
incentives arise because of shareholders’ limited liability. When the nonbank
faces a potential loss smaller than its net worth but larger than the bank’s, the
BHC, taking advantage of limited liability, reduces its loss by shifting it to
the bank. Consider the example of a BHC owning a bank with net worth of
$100 million and a real estate lending company with net worth of $200 million
(Table 3, line 1). Should the real estate subsidiary expect to incur loan losses of
$125 million, the BHC’s management could potentially save its shareholders
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by bank purchases of bad loans from the nonbank or bank loans made to the
nonbank’s troubled borrowers. As owner of the stock of both the bank and the
nonbank, the BHC is liable for losses only up to the value of its ownership
interest in each company, according to the principle of limited liability.24,25 If
the loss is borne by the nonbank (see Table 3, line 2), the value of the BHC’s
nonbank stock holdings will shrink by $125 million such that shareholders will
lose that amount. If, on the other hand, the potential loss can be shifted to the
bank, the shareholders’ loss is limited to the BHC’s ownership interest in the
bank, or $100 million.26 If the borrowers recover, the BHC neither gains nor
loses from the shift. If instead, the expected $125 million loss is realized, the
bank fails but the shift saves the BHC $25 million (Table 3, line 3). In the
latter case, the BHC’s shareholders beneﬁt at the expense of the deposit insur-
ance fund.
Nonbank subsidiaries are typically considerably smaller than their bank
afﬁliates. Thus, the circumstances under which the above-mentioned tactic
would beneﬁt the BHC’s shareholders might appear to be quite limited. But this
situation may change if the current limitations on afﬁliations between banks
and investment banks are relaxed. Banks might be afﬁliated with investment
banks as large as themselves. In addition, a bank that is itself troubled may ﬁnd
24 The protection of holding companies provided by the principle of limited liability is not
iron-clad. The major grounds upon which the courts will disregard limited liability is when it
is determined that the corporation has engaged in conduct or made representations likely to
deceive creditors into thinking the shareholder was the real debtor (Posner 1977, p. 297). For
further discussion of when the “corporate veil is pierced” and holding companies are held liable
for subsidiary losses beyond their equity investment, see Black, Miller, and Posner (1978), pp.
395–96, Posner (1977), pp. 296–97, and U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce (1987), pp. 19–20.
25 Two signiﬁcant examples of banking policies that depart from the principle of limited
liability are the Fed’s “source-of-strength” policy, and the cross-guarantee provision of the Fi-
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). The Federal
Reserve has attempted to require BHCs to provide ﬁnancial assistance to troubled subsidiary
banks (Gilbert 1991, p. 4, especially footnote 3; Keeton 1990, pp. 60–61) in its enforcement of
its source-of-strength policy. In other words, it has attempted to hold a bank’s shareholders (the
BHC) responsible for the losses of the bank beyond their equity investment. The Fed’s source-
of-strength doctrine, a part of Federal Reserve Regulation Y, requires a BHC to act as a source
of strength to its bank subsidiaries. Nevertheless, the ability of the Federal Reserve to enforce its
source-of-strength regulation may be in some doubt. In 1988 the Fed commenced proceedings
that might have required MCorp, a Texas BHC, to aid its insolvent bank subsidiaries. The attempt
was repudiated in a federal appeals court. The appeals court held that the source-of-strength
policy was in excess of the Fed’s regulatory jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
lower courts lacked jurisdiction because MCorp’s challenge to the Fed’s proceeding had been
premature, leaving the underlying substantive issue unresolved (Macey and Miller 1992, p. 656;
Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial, Inc., 502 U.S. 32 [1991]). FIRREA authorizes the FDIC
to recover from a solvent bank losses incurred by the FDIC in connection with the failure of an
afﬁliated bank (Keeton 1990, p. 58). Two federal circuit courts of appeal upheld FIRREA’s cross-
guarantee against constitutional challenges (Cayne, Alexander, and Lam 1994; Banking Policy
Report 1996, p. 3; BNA’s Banking Report 1996, p. 640).
26 Keeton (1990), pp. 56–57, and Saunders (1985), pp. 220–21, both discuss this incentive





Assets 300 NW∗∗ 300
Real Estate Lending Co.
(RELCO) Bank
Assets 2000 Liab∗∗ 1800 Assets 1000 Liab 900
NW 200 NW 100
(2)
Relco bears loss Parent BHC
Assets 300-125 NW 300-125 Parent’s assets and net worth
decline by $125M
RELCO Bank
Assets 2000-125 Liab 1800 Assets 1000 Liab 900
NW 200-125 NW 100
RELCO suffers a $125M loan loss.
Net worth falls by $125M
(3)
Loss shifted to Bank Parent BHC
Assets 300-100 NW 300-100 Parent’s assets and net worth
decline by $100M
RELCO Bank
Assets 2000 Liab 1800 Assets 1000-125 Liab 900-25
NW 200 NW 100-100
RELCO’s $125M loss is shifted
to Bank such that value of Bank’s
assets decline by $125M. Net
worth is consumed and creditors
(FDIC) bear remaining $25M loss.
∗ Here I focus on the parent corporation. One could focus instead on the consolidated enterprise—all
assets, liabilities, and net worth on one balance sheet. The results are equivalent.
∗∗ NW is net worth, Liab is liabilities.
its true economic value well below its book capital and smaller than the value
of an afﬁliate, therefore making the shift worthwhile.
Similarly, when a bank’s true economic value sinks below zero, limited
liability means that the BHC beneﬁts from shifts of losses from the nonbank to
the bank just as it beneﬁts from shifts of income in the opposite direction. Here,
the shifts simply amount to transfers from the deposit insurance fund to the36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
BHC’s shareholders. For example, the BHC has an incentive to have the bank
provide subsidized loans to afﬁliates or purchase services from nonafﬁliates at
prices higher than those that would be paid in arm’s-length transactions.27
An earlier discussion noted a counterincentive weighing against the in-
centive to shift losses to defend the BHC’s reputation. Here there is a similar
counterincentive. Sinking the bank to take advantage of limited liability protec-
tion is likely to have serious reputation consequences for the surviving BHC.
Only if the avoided losses exceed these reputation costs will the BHC choose
to shift losses and cause the bank’s failure.
4. CONCLUSION
This article has identiﬁed circumstances under which a BHC’s sharehold-
ers will have an economic incentive to shift nonbank losses to afﬁliated banks.
Congress and the bank regulators have reason to be concerned with any such
shifts which may increase the risk of, or produce, bank failures and claims
on the federal deposit insurance fund. The ﬁrewalls may provide a valuable
regulatory tool for limiting shifts of nonbank losses to banks and therefore for
containing BHC shareholders’ economic incentive to employ such shifts.
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